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Composite transposons are key vehicles for the worldwide spreading of genes that allow bacteria to survive toxic
compounds. Composite transposons consist of two smaller transposable elements called insertion sequences (ISs),
which flank the genes that permit such survival. Each IS in a composite transposon can either transpose alone,
selfishly, or it can transpose cooperatively, jointly with the other IS. Cooperative transposition can enhance an IS’s
chance of survival, but it also carries the risk of transposon destruction. I use game theory to show that the conditions
under which cooperative transposition is an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) are not biologically realistic. I then
analyze the distribution of thousands of ISs in more than 200 bacterial genomes to test the following prediction of the
game-theoretical model: if cooperative transposition was an ESS, then the closely spaced ISs that characterize
composite transposons should be more abundant in genomes than expected by chance. The data show that this is not
the case. Cooperativity can only be maintained in a transitional, far-from-equilibrium state shortly after a selection
pressure first arises. This is the case in the spreading of antibiotic resistance, where we are witnessing a fleeting
moment in evolution, a moment in which cooperation among selfish DNA molecules has provided a means of survival.
Because such cooperation does not pay in the long run, the vehicles of such survival will eventually disappear again.
My analysis demonstrates that game theory can help explain behavioral strategies even for mobile DNA.
Citation: Wagner A (2006) Cooperation is fleeting in the world of transposable elements. PLoS Comput Biol 2(12): e162. doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.0020162
Introduction
Composite transposable elements are key vehicles for the
worldwide spreading of genes that allow bacteria to survive
toxic compounds created by humans. Prominent examples
include, on one hand, genes responsible for antibiotic
resistance, perhaps the most serious challenge in the human
battle against infectious diseases. On the other hand, they
include genes for the degradation of toxic industrial waste,
genes crucial for cleaning up polluted environments [1–3].
The global scale and intensity at which bacteria are exposed
to these stressors has emerged only in the very recent
evolutionary past, essentially since the Industrial Revolution.
The transposons that spread these genes are themselves
composites—hence their name—of smaller transposable
elements called insertion sequences (ISs, Figure 1A). ISs are
arguably the simplest transposable elements. They typically
consist of one or more genes encoding a transposase
necessary for transposition, ﬂanked by two short (10–40 bp)
inverted repeats. Between two ISs lie the genes of interest
here: their functions are unrelated to transposition, but their
presence may permit survival. I will call these genes selectable
genes.
Transposition involving a composite transposon or its
parts can occur in two ways. First, the two ISs may transpose
jointly and thus carry the selectable genes to a different
location or a different DNA molecule. I will refer to such
transposition as cooperative transposition, because it requires
both IS elements. Each of the composite transposon’s IS has
an outside end (the repeat unit farthest from the selectable
genes) and an inside end (the repeat unit nearest to the
selectable genes, Figure 1). Cooperative transposition of the
entire transposon uses the outside ends of both ISs (Figure 1).
Second, any one IS (ISL or ISR) may transpose independently
from the other. I will call such transposition selﬁsh trans-
position. Transposition of either ISR or ISL uses the outside
and inside ends of the transposed IS (Figure 1).
The key question I will address here is whether cooperative
transposition can be an evolutionarily successful strategy
from the perspective of an IS—a prototypical example of
selﬁsh DNA. One could use several theoretical frameworks to
address this question. One such framework is that of
population genetics, which could be used to predict the
frequencies of ISs and composite transposons within and
among genomes. The disadvantage of this framework is its
complexity: population genetic models of transposable
element dynamics are unwieldy even to study the intra-
genome evolutionary dynamics [4]. They would get hopelessly
complicated for the intergenome dynamics that need to be
analyzed for this purpose.
Another candidate framework is game theory. Originally
devised to understand conﬂicts among humans, institutions,
and governments [5], it can serve to decipher many aspects of
nonhuman behavior [6, 35]. In recent years, game theory has
been applied to increasingly small-scale biological phenom-
ena. For instance, it can help explain the diversity of
microbial communities, the emergence of cooperativity in
bacterial populations, cross-feeding behavior in different
bacterial strains, and the evolution of selﬁshness in bacter-
iophages [7–12]. Game theory predicts successful behavioral
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through natural selection.
Game theory has several advantages for my purpose. First,
at its core is the concept of the ESS. Whether selﬁshness,
cooperativity, or a mix thereof is an ESS can be easily
determined by focusing on the individual composite trans-
poson and its evolutionary fate, without the unnecessary
detour of calculating all the quantities important to
population genetics. Second, game theory very naturally
captures the fact that a composite transposon consists of two
‘‘actors’’—the ISs—that can behave independently of each
other, but whose interaction is critical for the fate of the
whole. Game theory is powerful precisely in situations where
such interactions matter, whereas population genetics needs
to capture interactions through more complex concepts such
as frequency-dependent selection [13]. Third, and relatedly,
game theory very naturally accommodates the fact that ISL
and ISR can have different structures and thus different
‘‘interests’’ in propagating the whole.
Finally, I note a peculiar feature of the evolutionary
dynamics of composite transposons. Selﬁsh and cooperative
transposition have different effects on an IS’s reproductive
success only if the transposition product enters a piece of DNA
horizontally transferred to a new host (such as a conjugative
plasmid or a prophage). In this case, cooperative transposition
will allow the new host to survive if it is exposed to an
environment requiring the selectable genes. From the
perspective of one of the ISs, cooperative transposition then
allows the IS to gain one copy of itself (in a new genome). In
the case of selﬁsh transposition, a horizontally transferred
transposition product (ISL or ISR) may perish with its new host
in an environment where the selectable genes are needed.
Game theory very naturally accommodates this feature,
because it conceives of two ISs in a composite transposon as
two agents that maximize a payoff. The payoff currency is the
likelihood that a new host organism (of the same or of a
different bacterial ‘‘species’’) gains a copy of one of the ISs.
As a corollary of these observations, the intragenome
dynamics of transposable elements is irrelevant for the
evolutionary fate of cooperative transposition, because the
key difference between the reproductive success of selﬁsh and
cooperative transposition comes from the dynamics of
transposable elements between genomes. This is yet another
reason to eschew more complex population genetic models.
Cooperativity is by no means an assured ESS for trans-
posable elements, because it carries a cost. Aside from
successful transposition, transposase activity can trigger
DNA rearrangements with a variety of outcomes. These
include deletion of the selectable genes, of DNA adjacent to
Figure 1. Selfish and Cooperative Transposition, and the Game ISs Play
(A) shows the basic structure of a composite transposon. The narrow
open bar indicates the selectable gene(s). The wide bar inscribed with ISL
and ISR indicates the ISs flanking these genes. Gray triangles indicate the
inverted repeats that constitute the inside and outside ends of the ISs.
Red triangles indicate repeat sequences used in a particular type of
transposition event. The upper panel illustrates selfish transposition,
where either IS transposes independently from the other. The lower
panel illustrates cooperative transposition, where the composite trans-
poses as a whole, taking the selectable genes with it.
(B) The structure of the payoff matrix P describing the payoff to ISL in the
symmetric game, where both ISs have the same target specificity and the
same likelihood of undergoing DNA rearrangement. The parameter t is
the joint probability of transposition and horizontal transfer of the
transposition product, r is the probability of DNA rearrangement
associated with cooperative transposition, and s is the probability that
the new host of a transposable element will need the selectable genes
for its survival. Entry PSC is the payoff to ISL if a selfish ISL is paired with a
cooperative ISR in a composite, and analogously for the other entries of
P. The payoff matrix for ISR is the transpose of P.
(C) Schematic diagram of the evolutionary stable strategies (ESSs) in the
case of genetic dominance of selfish transposition. Selfish transposition
(‘‘S’’) is the only ESS if r . ts. Selfish and cooperative transposition (‘‘C’’)
are both ESSs if r , ts.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.0020162.g001
PLoS Computational Biology | www.ploscompbiol.org December 2006 | Volume 2 | Issue 12 | e162 1523
Synopsis
Molecules can display cooperation and selfish behavior. Wagner
investigates cooperative behavior in mobile DNA molecules called
transposable elements, which can ‘‘hop’’ among cells, which aids
the worldwide spreading of antibiotic resistance genes. A composite
transposon consists of two smaller mobile DNA molecules, M, that
flank another gene, G, M-G-M. The molecules M are able to change
location alone and selfishly. They are also able to change location
jointly and cooperatively, thus taking the gene G with them.
Cooperation facilitates the spreading of the gene G and of M itself.
Cooperativity is advantageous to M. However, Wagner’s paper
shows that cooperativity is short-lived and not stable on evolu-
tionary time scales. Cooperativity can only be maintained in a
transitional, far-from-equilibrium state shortly after a selection
pressure first arises. This is the case in the spreading of antibiotic
resistance, where we are witnessing a fleeting moment in evolution,
a moment in which cooperation among selfish DNA molecules has
provided a means of survival. Because such cooperation does not
pay in the long run, the vehicles of such survival will eventually
disappear again.
Cooperation in Transposable Elementsthe transposon, or of either of the two ISs. In addition, two or
more IS copies in a genome can serve as recombination
targets to the host’s homologous DNA recombination machi-
nery, which may lead to various DNA rearrangements
independent of transposition. Finally, spontaneous excision
(and loss) of the composite or of either IS can also occur. Rates
of rearrangement or loss, both as a byproduct of transposition
and through the host’s DNA recombination machinery, are
higher for composite transposons than for isolated ISs. The
reason lies in the greater number of repeat units in
composites. They can simply align inappropriately in more
ways than the two inverted repeats of a single IS [14–18].
Game-theoretic studies have two key prerequisites. First,
genetic variation in the behaviors under question must exist;
otherwise natural selection could not possibly reach any ESS.
It is thus crucial to note that the propensity of an IS to
transpose selﬁshly is determined by its structure. Most
important in this regard are the ends and their interaction
with the transposase. Multiple mutations in IS ends exist that
affect transposition activity of either IS element or the
composite. In some composite transposons such as Tn5,
transposase may also preferentially act on outside rather than
inside ends, thus leading to an elevated rate of cooperative
transposition [1,15,19,20]. A second preprequisite is that the
success of an agent’s action should depend on the other
agent’s action. This prerequisite is also clearly met: a player
(IS) with a propensity to transpose cooperatively (or selﬁshly)
has a payoff that depends on the other player’s strategy,
embodied in its DNA sequence.
The approach I take examines the conditions under which
selﬁshness, cooperation, or a mix thereof are ESSs for an IS.
Natural selection will lead to the accumulation of trans-
posable elements in bacterial genomes whose DNA embodies
such an ESS. If selﬁsh transposition is the only ESS, composite
transposons cannot persist in the long run. If pure
cooperation is the only ESS, composite transposons that do
not allow selﬁsh transposition (e.g., because of inactive inside
ends) arise and accumulate in prokaryotic genomes. My
results suggest that the conditions favoring composite trans-
position are rarely met, if ever. I provide corroborating
evidence by analyzing the distribution of IS spacing in 28
different IS families occurring in more than 200 completely
sequenced bacterial genomes.
Results
The Model
An IS’s payoff is the expected increase in the number of
host genomes that harbor a copy of it. Three factors can
affect this payoff’s value. They are represented by three
model parameters. The ﬁrst, t (‘‘transposition/transfer’’), is the
(joint) probability that transposition occurs and that the
transposition product undergoes horizontal transfer to a new
host genome. Of course, horizontal gene transfer can also
occur without transposition. If so, the payoff is independent
of transposition, so I need not consider it. Conversely,
transposition can occur without horizontal transfer, but the
reproductive success of an IS is identical for selﬁsh and
cooperative transposition within a genome and thus also
need not be considered further. The second parameter, s
(‘‘selection’’), is the probability that the host cells are subject to
an environment in which the selectable genes are necessary
for survival. The old host cell will survive because the original
host typically retains a copy of the transposable element [3].
However, the new host will survive (and the IS’s payoff will be
positive) only if the ISs acted cooperatively. Third, there is r
(‘‘rearrangement’’), the probability of a failed transposition
event that leads to a DNA rearrangement eliminating either
the IS or perhaps even killing the cell.
Payoffs for ISL and ISR
To begin with, I will focus on a scenario in which the payoff
is identical for both ISL and ISR of a composite.
Let us ﬁrst consider the case, ‘‘SS,’’ where the composite
has a structure that favors selﬁsh transposition of both ISs.
(For example, both inner ends may be fully functional, or the
ISs may be far apart, thus disfavoring cooperative trans-
position, because transposases act preferably in cis [21].) What
is the payoff to one IS, e.g., ISL in this case? With probability
½, it is ISL that undergoes the transposition event, and with
probability ½ it is ISR. In the ﬁrst case, the payoff to ISL can
be written as PSS ¼ (1 – t) 3 0 þ t[(1 – s) 3 1 þ s 3 0] ¼ t(1 – s),
because the transposable element will gain an additional copy
only if it is transposed and transferred to another cell
(probability t), where that cell is not under selection for the
presence of the selectable genes (probability 1 – s). In the
second case, where ISR is transposed, the payoff to ISL is zero.
On average, the payoff to ISL is thus
PSS ¼ð 1=2Þtð1   sÞð 1aÞ
Next, consider the case ‘‘CC,’’ where the transposon’s
structure strongly favors cooperative action. In this case, the
payoff to ISL (as well as to ISR) calculates analogously as (1 – t)
3 0 þ t[(1 – s) 3 1 þ s 3 1] ¼ t.
So far, I have not considered the risk of transposon loss due
to a DNA rearrangement caused by transposition. Such
rearrangements occur preferentially for cooperative trans-
position rather than for selﬁsh transposition. For example, in
the transposition of the transposon Tn10, such arrangements
occur at a rate of 10
 5 per cell and generation, whereas for its
constituent IS, IS10, this rate is on the order of 10
 8 per
generation [15]. Preferential loss of ISs during cooperative
transposition will lead to a payoff of ( 1) with probability r.I n
sum, one gets
PCC ¼ð 1   rÞt   r ¼ t   rð1 þ tÞð 1bÞ
The next step consists of the calculation of PCS, the payoff to
ISL if ISL acts cooperatively whereas ISR acts selﬁshly.
Biologically, this scenario corresponds to a composite in
which ISL has undergone a mutation, such that it cannot use
its own inside end, but only the outside end of ISR for
transposition, which is thus cooperative. ISR on the other
hand can use its own inside end. The overall outcome in this
case is either selﬁsh transposition of ISR (PCS ¼ 0) or
cooperative transposition (PCS ¼ t – r(1 þ t)). Which of these
outcomes occurs may depend on whether a transposase
expressed from ISL or ISR initiates the transposition event,
which may be a stochastic event. To allow all possible
outcomes and keep the model general, I will thus introduce
another parameter, d (for ‘‘dominance’’) that ranges from 0 to 1
and indicates the propensity of either outcome. If d¼1, then
PCS ¼ 0. In this case, selﬁshness is dominant over coopera-
PLoS Computational Biology | www.ploscompbiol.org December 2006 | Volume 2 | Issue 12 | e162 1524
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[22]. If d¼0, then PCS¼t – r(1+t), in which case cooperativity
is dominant over selﬁshness. For 0 , d , 1, the payoff is
intermediate, that is,
PCS ¼ð 1   dÞ½t   rð1 þ tÞ  ð1cÞ
The same reasoning applies to the calculation of PSC, the
payoff to ISL if ISR acts cooperatively whereas ISL acts selﬁshly.
If d¼0, then PSC¼t – r(1þt). If d¼1, then PSC¼t(1 – s). (The
factor ½ entering PSS does not occur here, because selﬁsh
transposition of ISR is not an option.) For 0 , d , 1, we get
PSC ¼½ t   rðt þ 1Þ  þ d½rðt þ 1Þ ts ð 1dÞ
In sum, one obtains the payoff matrix P of Figure 1B, which
shows the payoff to ISL in standard game-theoretic notation,
with the approximation r(tþ1) ’ r (valid because t , d , 1). I
analyze the game for the full matrix as deﬁned by Equation 1
in Dataset S1 but will use this approximation to discuss the
results here.
ISL and ISR May Not Receive the Same Payoffs
So far, I have tacitly assumed that ISL and ISR have the same
expected payoffs in the same kind of transposition event.
This, however, need not be the case. Aside from variation in
their ends, ISL and ISR may also encode transposases with
slightly different target speciﬁcities. This is not far-fetched.
For example, different members of the IS3 family generate
target site duplications of different lengths and also show
different target speciﬁcities [23]. The same holds for members
of the IS5 family, where one subfamily (ISL2) shows a target
preference for the nucleotide triplet ANT, another (IS1031)
shows a preference for TNA, and yet others (ISH1, IS903)
show no marked target speciﬁcities [23]. As a result, ISL and
ISR may have different likelihoods t of being transposed into a
mobilizable plasmid or prophage and thus be transferred to a
new host. Analogous variation may exist for the ISs’
propensity to undergo DNA rearrangement after trans-
position. Such differences naturally lead to the notion of an
asymmetric game, which is characterized by two payoff
matrices. Their structure is analogous to that of P from
Figure 1B and is shown in Equation 7 of Dataset S1.
Cooperativity Is an ESS Only if DNA Rearrangements Are
Much Rarer than Horizontal Transfer
I will now brieﬂy summarize the most important results of
the model, whose behavior is exhaustively analyzed in Dataset
S1. If both ISs are very similar and thus receive the same
payoff, selﬁsh transposition is the only ESS as long as
r .
1 þ s
2

t ð2aÞ
Cooperative transposition is an ESS, either alone or in
conjunction with selﬁsh transposition as a second ESS, only if
r , st ð2bÞ
Notice that s , (1 þ s)/2 , 1.
The relationship of Equation 2 is very simple and holds for
all values of d, that is, regardless of whether selﬁshness is
genetically dominant (d¼1), recessive (d¼0), or intermediate.
The only region of parameter space not covered by Equation
2 is the narrow region where st , r , t(1þs)/2. Here the value
of d matters. If selﬁshness is dominant (d ¼ 1)—the most
favorable case for selﬁsh transposition—then selﬁsh trans-
position is already an ESS if r . ts, otherwise cooperative and
selﬁsh transposition coexist as stable ESSs (Figure 1C; and
Figure S2 in Dataset S1). Selﬁsh dominance is biologically
most realistic: envision a composite transposon whose ISL can
transpose selﬁshly, but whose ISR transposes cooperatively. (It
may have a mutated inside end and preferably transpose
using the outside end of ISL.) Because transposases act
preferentially in cis [21], and because the likelihood of
successful transposition decreases dramatically with the
distance of the IS ends, a successful (cooperative) trans-
position event initiated from ISR is much less likely than a
selﬁsh transposition event initiated from ISL. However, even
if cooperativity were dominant (d ¼ 0), results would not
change dramatically. In this case selﬁsh transposition is an
ESS if r . t(1 þs)/2, otherwise cooperativity is the only ESS. A
mixed ESS exists only in a very narrow interval of the
parameter range (Figure S2 in Dataset S1) and is thus unlikely
to be of much biological relevance.
For the realistic case of selﬁsh dominance, cooperativity is
never the sole ESS and always coexists with the selﬁsh ESS. In
this case, the actually attained ESS depends on the initial
condition of the evolutionary dynamics. The ESS will be
selﬁsh transposition if the composite, when ﬁrst established,
consists of selﬁshly transposing ISs. The ESS will be
cooperative transposition if both ISs initially transpose
cooperatively. Composite transposons most likely originate
by the transposition of an IS into its own neighborhood on a
DNA molecule, such that original and copy come to be
separated by one or a few (selectable) genes. This means that
the initial condition of the evolutionary dynamics is close to
the all-selﬁsh state, unless a mutation in one of the ISs occurs
as a result of this initial transposition. In consequence, selﬁsh
transposition is the evolutionarily stable outcome also in this
case. Cooperative transposition has a chance to emerge only
if r ,, st, because then the basin of attraction of the selﬁsh
ESS is very small.
Despite its much greater mathematical complexity, the
asymmetric game, where the two ISs derive different beneﬁts
from selﬁsh versus cooperative transposition, yields very
similar results. In Dataset S1, I analyze the asymmetric model,
as well as a complementary, non-game theoretic analysis, both
of which have similar results.
In sum, cooperative transposition can emerge as an ESS
only if the risk r of DNA rearrangements as a result of
transposition is much smaller than the product of the
likelihood t of transposition/horizontal transfer of the trans-
posable element, and the probability s that the new host
survives only if it acquires the selectable genes.
Prokaryotic Genomes and Plasmids Are Not Enriched for
Composite Transposons
If cooperative transposition was a frequently attained ESS,
prokaryotic genomes should contain (stable) composite
transposons in abundance. I tested whether this is the case.
In genomic DNA, candidate composite transposons are easily
identiﬁed as (i) two closely linked ISs (e.g., through intact
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small number of genes. Both criteria are necessary (although
not sufﬁcient) for a functional composite. I assessed the
abundance of such candidate composites for members of 28
different IS families in 376 different completely sequenced
bacterial genomes and plasmids (202 complete genomes).
The ﬁrst notable observation regards the distribution of
the distance between nearest-neighbor ISs, the two ISs that
are most closely spaced among all ISs of a given family in an
examined genome. Among a total of 5,901 nearest-neighbor
IS pairs I examined here, only the tiny fraction of 3.9% (233)
were spaced less than 30 kbp apart. I included only these pairs
of ISs in subsequent analyses, because virtually all known
composite transposons are less than 30 kbp long [1]. Next, I
asked for each genome or plasmid, and for each IS family,
separately, whether the number of adjacent ISs with a
distance between 0.5 and 30 kbp is greater than expected
by chance alone, given the total number of ISs in the genome
or plasmid. I did so by employing a randomization assay that
reshufﬂes the existing ISs within a DNA molecule (see
Materials and Methods). The answer is shown in Figure 2A.
Only one genome contains more IS pairs (three) in the above
distance bracket than expected by chance alone (Bonferroni-
corrected p , 0.01). The genome is that of Yersinia pestis strain
CO92, and the IS is IS21.
In a second, more ﬁne-grained approach, I asked whether
the distance between the closest ISs of a given kind in a DNA
molecule is smaller than expected by chance alone, using the
same randomization method. Figure 2B shows the example of
IS91 in the genome of Rhodopirellula baltica. In this analysis, the
distance of the closest nearest-neighbor pair in the above
Yersinia pestis species is not smaller than expected by chance
alone (p¼0.6953). Figure 2C shows the results of this analysis
for all 28 IS families and for all genomes. Only four IS pairs
showaBonferroni-corrected p,0.05. Inthreeofthem,theISs
are adjacent to each other, with no intervening genes. The
fourth involves two IS630 sequences in Yersinia pseudotubercu-
losis IP 32953 spaced at less than 2 kbp. Repeating this analysis
more conservatively, with IS pairs of different maximum
distances, yields very similar results. Figure S4 shows an
example involving ISs no more than 10 kbp apart.
In sum, there is no evidence for an overabundance of
closely spaced ISs with intervening genes in the examined
genomes and IS families. If anything, the data suggest that
such ISs may be underabundant. For example, the many p-
values close to one in Figure 2A suggest that genomes contain
few closely spaced IS pairs.
Discussion
A scenario creating evolutionarily stable composite trans-
posons with cooperatively acting ISs begins with the random
transposition of two identical (selﬁsh) ISs to nearby locations
in the genome. If there are genes between these ISs that can
Figure 2. No Significant Enrichment of Composite Transposons in 376
Completely Sequenced Bacterial Genomes and Plasmids
(A) The horizontal axis shows the number of nearest-neighbor IS pairs at
a distance between 0.5 and 30 kb in the bacterial genomes examined.
The p-value on the vertical axis is the likelihood that this number of IS
pairs is greater than expected by chance alone, according to a
randomization test described in Materials and Methods. There are two
horizontal lines near the horizontal axis. The upper line represents a p-
value of 0.01, the lower line a p-value of 0.00064, which is the Bonferroni-
corrected value of p¼0.05, given that n¼78 independent statistical tests
carried out for this analysis (0.00064 ¼ 0.05/78).
(B) The randomized distribution of nearest-neighbor distance for IS91 in
the genome of Rhodopirellula baltica. There are five members of this IS in
the genome, and the closest pair of them is 3,051 bp apart. Based on this
randomization test, this distance is significantly closer than expected by
chance at a p ¼ 0.0074.
(C) The horizontal axis shows the minimal distance between nearest-
neighbor IS pairs that are between 0.5 and 30 kb apart in a genome. The
vertical axis shows the likelihood that this minimal distance is observed
by chance alone, based on the randomization test from (B) (described in
Materials and Methods). The upper and lower horizontal lines represent
Bonferroni-corrected p-values of p ¼ 0.05 (0.00064 ¼ 0.05/78) and p ¼
0.01 (0.000128¼0.01/78). Both panels contain n¼78 datapoints derived
from ISs in 28 different families.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.0020162.g002
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Cooperation in Transposable Elementsconfer an advantage to a new host after horizontal transfer,
natural selection may favor transposition of the resulting
composite. DNA changes that cause preferential cooperative
transposition may then occur, and result in the preferential
propagation of such (stabilized) composites. Potential exam-
ples of such DNA changes are mutations in the transposase
genes, in the IS ends, or in both, that lead to preferential use
of transposon outside ends (Figure 1A).
Cooperative transposition can emerge as an ESS only if the
risk r of transposon rearrangements resulting from trans-
position is much smaller than the product of the likelihood t
of transposition followed by transfer of the transposon, and
the probability s that the new host survives only if it acquires
the selectable genes. The smaller s is, the weaker the selective
advantage of cooperative transposition, and the smaller the
chances that these conditions are met. The most favorable
condition for the emergence of cooperativity is that of very
strong selection (s ¼ 1). In this case, r , t is necessary for the
emergence of cooperativity.
Quantitative data on rates of potentially destructive DNA
rearrangements are available for the composite transposon
IS10. Such rearrangements occur at a rate of approximately
10
 5 per cell and generation. These events are promoted by
the transposase activity of Tn10 (as opposed to by the mere
presence of its two repeat sequences). This number becomes
striking if one considers that the rate of transposition for this
composite transposon is 10
 7, or two order of magnitudes
lower. This means that only one in 100 initiated transposition
events may lead to normal transposition [15,18]. DNA
rearrangements in the course of the transposition process
are the rule rather than the exception.
Chromosomal gene transfer under laboratory conditions
via conjugative plasmids such as the F-factor from laboratory
strains of Escherichia coli occur typically at a rate of 10
 5 to
10
 7 per donor cell, and may be much higher in some strains.
Despite an abundance of data on horizontal transfer under
laboratory condition, much less is known about horizontal
transfer in the wild. Not surprisingly, rates of horizontal
transfer are often low in the wild [24]. For example, conjugal
transfer frequencies of an IncQ plasmid from E. coli to
Ralstonia eutropha in the rhizosphere of wheat occurs at
frequencies of 0.5 3 10
 10 per donor cell [25]. Tetracycline
resistance genes are transferred through bacterial conjuga-
tion between strains of the bacterium Arcanobacterium pyogenes,
a pathogen of domestic animals, at rates between 2.5 3 10
 10
and 4.4 3 10
 9 per donor cell [26]. In an example involving
not conjugation but viral transduction of the composite
transposon Tn5, Jiang and Paul [27] found transduction rates
between 5.13310
 9 and 1.33 310
 7 per colony-forming unit
among cells of marine communities. Transduction rates per
donor cell would be lower, because not all donor cells may
harbor fully infectious phages. In addition, all these rates do
not account for the probability that a transposable element
ﬁrst has to transpose into a mobilizable piece of DNA, such as
a prophage or a conjugative plasmid. This probability is also
small, because such DNA molecules are small transposition
targets compared with the bacterial chromosome.
Taken together, these limited data suggest that rates of
DNA arrangement associated with transposition are by no
means smaller than rates of horizontal transfer, as required
for the evolution of stable cooperative transposition. And
even if they were smaller, cooperative transposition would
face an additional obstacle: especially for dominant self-
ishness, cooperative and selﬁsh transposition may be coex-
isting ESSs, and cooperativity can arise only if the ISs of a
newly created composite transposon already transpose
preferentially jointly. This condition is unlikely to be met,
precisely because composite transposons initially arise from
selﬁsh transposition of ISs.
In sum, cooperative transposition is not an ESS of ISs. By
implication, higher-order composites (composite transposons
made of composite transposons) would also not be evolutio-
narily stable.
Every mathematical model abstracts from immensely
complex natural phenomena by neglecting some factors that
may be of limited importance. One such factor is the
evolutionary dynamics of transposable elements within a
genome. The prime reason is that the adaptive differences
between selﬁsh and cooperative transposition only emerge if
one considers the dynamics among genomes.
Another neglected factor is that a transposition event can
lead to the elimination of the transposed IS at its original
location [1]. As opposed to the DNA rearrangements that the
model does represent, such nonreplicative transposition does
not destroy a transposable element but leaves only one instead
of two copies of the element in the genome. Nonreplicative
transposition affects mostly the dynamics of transposable
elements within a genome, but the key difference between
selﬁsh and cooperative transposition emerges from the
dynamics among genomes. (Horizontal transfer typically leaves
a transposable element in the original genome). In addition,
nonreplicative transposition probably affects individual ISs
and composite transposons in similar ways, because it results
from the mechanics of the transposition process itself.
A third factor not modeled here is that the ISs of composite
transposons are two closely spaced, highly similar DNA
repeats, which are good targets for a cell’s recombination
machinery. Pertinent data come from the rate of precise
excision of transposable elements, which may not be triggered
by transposition itself. The result of such excision is a
complete loss of a transposon from a genome. The excision
rate has been estimated at 10
 6 for the composite Tn5. In
contrast, the excision rate for IS50, the constituent IS of Tn5 is
3310
 9 [16]. Similarly, the excision rate for Tn 10 is 10
 9, and
for Tn109s constituent IS, IS10, it is an order of magnitude
lower [15,18]. Some composite transposons, such as Tn5271
[28] may have loss rates as high as 10
 3 per cell and generation.
The recombinational instability of composite transposons
may thus further disfavor cooperative transposition.
Taking these observations together, it is perhaps less
surprising that my analysis of more than 200 bacterial
genomes ﬁnds very few closely linked IS pairs that might
constitute composite transposons, and no excess—perhaps
even a deﬁciency—of such pairs from what would be expected
by chance alone. A lack of available raw material for natural
selection—variation in IS element spacing—is not likely to
account for this pattern. Estimates of transposition rates for
bacterial ISs and similar transposable elements in eukaryotes
range over two orders of magnitude, between 10
 3 to 10
 5 per
infected cell and generation [1,4,18,29–31]. Importantly, this
rate of transposition refers to successful transposition events,
events without strongly deleterious effects that would kill the
host. In populations like that of E. coli with effective sizes on
the order of 10
8, and a number of 100–300 generations per
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5 33
10
7 transposition events per population and year. Because
many ISs can insert into multiple sites not only in a genome
but even in a stretch of DNA on the order of a gene’s length,
many such events may lead to close spacing of ISs, from which
natural selection might recruit composite transposons with
potentially useful genes. Similarly, the enormous success of
horizontal gene transfer in bacterial genome evolution
suggests that plenty of genes can prove useful to a new host
after their horizontal transfer [3].
Although the data support the model predictions, an
apparent conundrum remains: composite transposons do
exist and are successful vehicles of gene transfer in situations
of extremely high anthropogenic pressure on bacterial
populations. The most notable example is the evolution of
antibiotic resistance. The following argument shows that this
observation is fully consistent with the absence of coopera-
tivity as an ESS: composite transposons may be abundant in
far-from-equilibrium situations.
Imagine two bacterial species, 1 and 2, with similar genome
composition and IS content. Genome 1 has a gene G necessary
for survival in a speciﬁc environment, whereas genome 2 lacks
this gene, and needs to acquire it via transposon-mediated
horizontal transfer. Among the many individual transposition
events occurring in population 1 over short evolutionary time
scales, some may lead to the emergence of a composite
transposonTinwhichtwoISsﬂankthegeneG.Iflistherateat
which T arises and if m is the rate at which T disappears again
(through random transposition of ISs), then population
genetic theory [34] tells us that a mutational equilibrium will
ariseinpopulation1.ThefrequencyofTatequilibriumisp¼l
/(mþl) ,, 1. Transposon T is necessary for the transfer of G
from population 1 to population 2, but once population 2 has
acquired the gene G, T becomes dispensable again. Within
genomes of population 2, the ISs ﬂanking G are then free to
transpose to new locations. In the long run, some (low)
mutational equilibrium frequency p of T, similar to that in
population 1, will be attained. This argument can be easily
extended to metapopulations of multiple species. In the long
run, all populations in such a metapopulation will have
acquired G, but the frequency of T in each population may
be very low.
In sum, we see that transposable elements can be important
for gene transfer without requiring their stable maintenance,
as would occur in an evolutionarily stable equilibrium. High
frequencies of transposable elements can only be maintained
in a transitional, far-from-equilibrium state shortly after a
selection pressure ﬁrst arises. This is exactly the case for
antibiotic resistance in clinical isolates of bacterial popula-
tions.
We are witnessing a ﬂeeting moment in evolution, a
moment in which cooperation among selﬁsh DNA molecules
has provided a means of survival. Because such cooperation
does not pay in the long run, the vehicles of such survival will
eventually disappear again.
Materials and Methods
Analysis of insertion sequence distribution. The ﬁles listed under
Accession Numbers comprise the DNA sequence and annotation for
202 completely sequenced bacterial genomes as well as multiple
extrachromosomal DNA molecules. The ISs IS1, IS2, IS3, IS51, IS150,
IS407, IS4, IS5, IS427, IS903, IS1031, ISH1, ISL2, IS6, IS21, IS30, IS66,
IS91, IS110, IS200, IS605, IS256, IS630, IS982, IS1380, ISAs1, and ISL3
are representative members of all 28 major families of bacterial ISs
[23]. I determined the position and pairwise distance of 5,967
transposase genes annotated as belonging to these ISs in all of the
above chromosomal and extrachromosomal sequences. Sixty-six of
the DNA molecules examined contained only one transposable
element. The remaining 5,967   66 ¼ 5,901 ISs occurred in more
than one copy per genome or plasmid. This means that there are
5,901 pairs of ISs of the same family that could potentially form the
ISs which constitute a composite transposon. However, most of these
pairs are not viable candidates for the IS elements constituting a
composite transposon. First, many of them are too far apart. (Most
known composite transposons are less than 30 kbp in length.) Second,
some of them are too close together to harbor genes between them
that are necessary to constitute a composite transposon. Thus I
restricted myself in subsequent steps of my analysis to nearest-
neighbor ISs of the same IS family whose beginning points (upstream-
most position on the Watson strand) were at least d ¼ 500 bp apart,
and that had no more than a maximum distance of dþ¼ 10 – 30 kb
(Figure 2; and Figure S4 in Dataset S1).
For a given genome with a given number k of ISs in a given family, I
ﬁrst determined the number of nearest-neighbor IS pairs (‘‘candidate
pairs’’) that meet these criteria, and the pair with the smallest nearest-
neighbor distance. I then asked whether candidate pairs, both
collectively and individually, were signiﬁcantly closer in the genome
than expected by chance alone. I used a randomization test to address
this question. Speciﬁcally, I ﬁrst determined the positions of the n
midpoints of all intergenic regions in the genome. I then distributed
the k ISs randomly among the n midpoints, and determined (i) the
number of (randomized) IS pairs in the distance interval (d ,d þ), and
(ii) the distance in bp between the nearest neighbors. I repeated this
process 10,000 times, which yields a distribution of randomized
nearest-neighbor distances. I recorded as a p-value the fraction of
reshufﬂing events in which (i) more IS pairs are in the length interval
(d ,d þ), and (ii) the pairwise distance of an IS pair was shorter than for
the randomized ISs. Small p-values mean that (i) more ISs in IS pairs
are close together, and (ii) the ISs in the shortest IS pair are
signiﬁcantly closer than expected by chance alone. I repeated this test
for all IS pairs, that is, in all of the 28 families and in all of the
examined DNA molecules. The test implicitly assumes that trans-
position into noncoding regions has a higher likelihood of survival. I
note that the test would be more conservative if the reshufﬂing
among noncoding regions was relaxed, for example, by allowing
insertions anywhere in noncoding regions, because in this case the
randomized ISs could be closer together, which might lead to an
increase (lower signiﬁcance) of the p-values observed. In other words,
I would observe even fewer signiﬁcant p-values.
Supporting Information
Dataset S1. Supplementary Online Results
Found at doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.0020162.sd001 (151 KB DOC).
Accession Numbers
I obtained all 376 genbank ﬁles that were available for bacterial
genomes from the National Center for Biotechnology Information
(NCBI) in February 2005 (ftp://ftp.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/genbank/genomes/
Bacteria/): RefSeq ID NC_000117 to NC_007530.
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